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Pound’s reserve lead faded as the dollar still dominates

Pounds were 87.4 percent of international reserves in 1947; in 2025 sterling still traded heavily, while the dollar remained far larger in reserves, FX and Treasuries.

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The British pound once held most of the world’s official reserves, and its later decline sits inside the same international story as today’s efforts to use the US dollar less. De-dollarization covers steps by governments, companies and markets to cut the dollar’s role in reserves, trade invoicing and settlement, cross-border finance and domestic payments. Dollar dominance gives the United States scope to impose economic harm through sanctions, including freezing assets and barring banks from Swift or from clearing through the US banking system.

Ken Rogoff says there is “a huge appetite for alternative transaction vehicles among friends and foes alike, outside the prying eyes and the global reach of US authorities.” The figures still show the dollar dominant in reserves, foreign-exchange trading and international holdings of US Treasuries. The concern highlighted is pricing against close substitutes, and the larger threat named is the scale of current and projected US government budget deficits.

Countries use reserves to intervene in foreign-exchange markets, manage trade imbalances and insure against global financial shocks. If imports exceed exports, a country must sell assets to foreigners; if those buyers do not want domestic assets, the public sector can sell reserves. Reserves also signal that debt can be repaid. Demand has therefore centred on high-quality assets that can be sold in a crisis. Gold long served that role, and so did the government liabilities of trusted states, first the United Kingdom and then the United States.

In 1947, 87.4 percent of international reserves were in pounds. The post-war fall of sterling and rise of the dollar followed the Bretton Woods system of fixed rates, under which the United States undertook to convert dollars into gold at $35 an ounce and other currencies were pegged to the dollar. Accumulating dollar reserves let the United States import more than it exported and sell government debt to the rest of the world. In 1965, French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing described that position as an exorbitant privilege.

Bretton Woods collapsed in August 1971, when President Nixon suspended the convertibility of dollars into gold. As countries adjusted to floating rates, the dollar’s share of reserves rose to a peak of 79.7 percent in 1976, fell to 50.6 percent in 1990, climbed to 71.0 percent in 1999 and stood at 56.8 percent in 2025. The euro’s creation in 1999 produced euro reserves of about 20 percent, a share that has stayed relatively steady. A residual “others” category includes the renminbi, which was 2.0 percent of reserves in 2025.

Those percentages conceal the growth of the stock. Total international reserves rose from $1.9 trillion in 1999 to $13.1 trillion in 2025, so dollar assets in reserves increased from $1.35 trillion to $7.44 trillion even as their share declined.

The dollar is also dominant in foreign-exchange turnover. The Bank for International Settlements surveys central banks every three years on daily trading in spot, forward, swap, option and other derivative markets. Turnover across all currencies grew from $3.9 trillion in 2010 to $9.6 trillion in 2025. Because each trade has two currencies, shares add to 200 percent. Almost 90 percent of transactions involve the dollar, which remains the vehicle currency linking pairs that lack an active direct market. Its share has fluctuated slightly and is edging higher as overall volumes grow.

The euro, the yen and the pound all show declining shares of transactions. Because the market itself has grown sharply, the dollar value of trading in those currencies has still risen. In 2025, daily turnover was $2.77 trillion for the euro, $1.61 trillion for the yen, $0.98 trillion for the pound and $0.81 trillion for the renminbi, against $8.5 trillion involving the dollar.

Foreign holdings of US Treasuries are lower as a share of the debt and higher in dollars. Foreigners held almost 50 percent of Treasuries between 2009 and 2015 and now hold around 30 percent, while the stock they own has continued to rise. In the mid-2010s, foreign ownership of $6.2 trillion was close to domestic ownership of $6.9 trillion. The large rise in US government debt that began in 2014 was taken up mainly by US residents, who now hold $22.2 trillion. Foreigners now hold $9.2 trillion.

US government bonds long yielded relatively little because they were treated as safe assets: known cash flows, low default risk, easy to value and trade, and usable as collateral in repurchase agreements or for derivatives margin. Investors accepted returns below those on close substitutes, much as they hold cash that pays no interest.

Before the 2008 global financial crisis, interest-rate swap spreads were generally positive. The 30-year spread turned negative in 2009 and has stayed negative, with the pattern moving down the maturity curve. Collateralised, marked-to-market swaps are now treated as having lower default risk than Treasuries. Wenxin Du, Ritt Keerati and Jesse Schreger report average dollar swap spreads of 16.02 basis points a year at five years in 2010–15 and minus 20.24 basis points in 2021–25. As Treasury supply grew, the Treasury yield rose above the matching swap’s fixed rate.

Pricing has also shifted against foreign government bonds of similar maturity once foreign-exchange risk is removed in the forward or currency-swap market, creating a synthetic dollar bond. If default risk, liquidity and crisis performance matched, covered interest parity would leave the yields equal. Deviations therefore reflect some mix of those differences. Du, Keerati and Schreger find that annualised average deviations turned negative after the crisis for all G10 countries except Japan. At five years they averaged 21.4 basis points from 2000 to 2006 and minus 25.1 basis points from 2023 to 2025.

Those bond deviations combine currency-swap deviations, based on secured overnight rates, with the gap between the dollar swap spread and its foreign counterpart. The swaps are marked to market and secured, so they are treated as effectively risk-free. Positive currency-swap deviations mean the party long dollars pays more than the secured overnight dollar rate. At five years those deviations averaged 12.89 basis points in 2010–15 and 19.98 basis points in 2021–25. The negative dollar swap spread is what drives the negative bond deviations. With $32 trillion of bonds outstanding, each extra 10 basis points of required yield means another $32 billion of interest a year.

Some European economists see room to raise the euro’s international status. Helene Rey and Ludovic Subran frame the euro as a response to the line US Treasury Secretary John Connally gave G10 finance ministers in November 1971, after Bretton Woods fell: “the dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.” They argue that a stronger international euro requires more European safe assets. The European Commission has issued bonds backed by its own budget, with about €800 billion outstanding. Those bonds are not joint and several liabilities of individual EU countries.

Common eurozone debt is constrained by the lack of political agreement on repayment when debts and budgets differ. French and German debt-to-GDP ratios are 118 percent and 64 percent, ten-year yields 4.79 percent and 3.44 percent, and budget deficits 5.4 percent and 0.35 percent of GDP. Rogoff notes the difficulty and cautions that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may eventually push greater fiscal and political unity in the eurozone.

China would like the renminbi to replace the dollar in international finance, but international holdings of renminbi debt are only about 1 percent of total international debt, similar to Japan and Australia. Severe capital controls that separate China’s domestic market from international markets would also have to be loosened.

Other channels have grown faster. Since 2015, the People’s Bank of China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payments System has cleared cross-border yuan payments covering bonds, derivatives and foreign exchange. Geopolitical shifts helped push volumes to an annualised run-rate above $30 trillion, or ¥206 trillion, last year. CIPS now links more than 5,000 financial institutions in 190 countries.

Carolyn Wilkins notes that about 98 percent of stablecoin capitalisation is dollar-denominated. Other central banks, including the European Central Bank, are preparing central-bank digital currencies. A euro CBDC aimed at 2029 could, as Laurie Hodrick has discussed in the context of tokenised trading, support wider international use of the euro.

At their September 2026 summit, the BRICS countries set aside a plan for a common currency. They are expanding BRICS Pay so that national systems such as India’s UPI, Brazil’s Pix and China’s WeChat Pay can be used across borders without the dollar. A Brazilian traveller in India can pay from a Pix account; the real balance is debited at once and the seller’s rupee account is credited at once. Messages go to a BRICS Pay decentralised clearinghouse that nets payments daily, after which a net payment is made. Banks must currently hold accounts in every currency. The BRICS countries eventually want aggregate settlement in the CBDCs of the individual currencies.

The dollar remains widely used in foreign-exchange trading, as a reserve currency and as an investment, even where governments, companies and individuals want alternatives. The clear change since before the global financial crisis is the higher yield on Treasuries relative to other major government bonds. Foreign investors are still adding Treasuries, but not as fast as US deficits are adding supply, so a larger share is held at home.

Robert J. Hodrick, Nomura Professor Emeritus of International Finance at Columbia Business School, writes that no clear competitor exists and that dollar dominance is far from secured. He agrees with Rogoff that the greatest danger is the size of US budget deficits and complacency built during ultra-low rates, an environment he describes as open to continued inflation or an outright fiscal crisis. Demand can still shift toward other currencies and move prices, including a weaker dollar, without a change in the supply of alternative assets. Without a change in fiscal policy, he argues, a fiscal crisis with substantial dollar depreciation becomes more likely over time.

British pound reserves · US dollar dominance · de-dollarization · sterling FX turnover · US Treasury holdings · BRICS Pay · United Kingdom international affairs and world news